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Stephens and Molony: Practice and Procedure

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I.

DEFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: PRIVITY NO LONGER A
REQUIREMENT

In Graham v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.,1
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the appellant insured was collaterally estopped from relitigating an issue decided against the insured in a previous case. The court maintained'that collateral estoppel was appropriate despite a lack of
privity between the two insurance companies. This decision
changes the doctrine of defensive collateral estoppel 2 in South
Carolina by eliminating the privity requirement,3 and by allowing defendants to assert collateral estoppel in the absence of
mutuality. 4 In addition, Graham may lay the foundation for the
adoption of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel in South
Carolina.
A fire destroyed appellant Graham's home and damaged his
automobile. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(State Farm Mutual) insured the automobile, and the respondent, State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (State
Farm Fire and Casualty) carried Graham's home owner policy.
Despite the similarity of their names, the two insurance companies were separate entities and no privity existed between them.5
State Farm Mutual refused to pay appellant's claim for

1. 277 S.C. 389, 287 S.E.2d 495 (1982).
2. Collateral estoppel is the doctrine preventing a party from relitigating an issue

which he litigated and lost in a prior suit. BLACK'S LAW DIeTONARY 237 (5th ed. 1979).
For a comprehensive examination of res judicata and collateral estoppel in South Carolina, see Stewart, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in South Carolina, 28 S.C.L.
R.v. 451 (1977).
3. In Hart v. Bates, 17 S.C. 35 (1881), the South Carolina Supreme Court stated

that three requirements must be met before a defendant will be allowed to assert collateral estoppel: "the parties must be the same, or their privies; the subject-matter must be
the same, and the precise point must have been ruled." Id. at 40. These factors have
been required in South Carolina for one hundred years, although the supreme court has
made exceptions to the rule on policy grounds. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying
text.
4. Cf. Stewart, supra note 2, at 476.

5. Brief for Appellant at 11.
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damages to his car. Graham sued for breach of contract, and the
insuror defended by arguing that the fire was incendiary in nature and willfully caused by the appellant.6 The sole issue before
the jury was the cause of the fire, and the jury returned a verdict
in favor of the defendant insuror.7
When State Farm Fire and Casualty refused to pay Graham's claim for damages to his home, he initiated a second
breach of contract suit. State Farm Fire and Casualty defended
on the ground that Graham was collaterally estopped by the previous judgment from relitigating the cause of the fire.' The trial
court granted summary judgment for the insuror, and the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.9
In affirming the trial court's order, the supreme court rejected Graham's contention that lack of privity between the two
insurance companies precluded the application of collateral estoppel by judgment. 10 "The modern trend," the court observed,
"is to disregard the privity requirement in applying estoppel by
judgment."1 The court also noted that it had recognized estoppel by judgment in the absence of privity in Mackey v. Frazier,1
Watson v. Goldsmith,1 3 and Jenkins v. Atlantic Coast Railroad
In citing Mackey, Watson, and Jenkins, the court implied
that South Carolina had previously abandoned privity as an element of collateral estoppel.1 5 The court's implication is mislead6. 277 S.C. at 390, 287 S.E.2d at 495-96.
7. Id. at 390, 287 S.E.2d at 496.
8. Id., 287 S.E.2d at 496.
9. Id. at 390, 287 S.E.2d at 495.
10. Brief for Appellant at 17.
11. 277 S.C. at 390, 287 S.E.2d at 493. Although the court cited no authority for this
statement, cases from other jurisdictions do offer support. E.g., Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Pep3i-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. George Colon &
Co., Inc., 260 N.Y. 305, 183 N.E. 506 (1932); Atkinson v. White, 60 Me. 396 (1872).
12. 234 S.C. 81, 106 S.E.2d 895 (1959)(the party who lost in an earlier suit against
the defendant's employer was precluded from bringing a later suit against the employee
based on the same occurrence).
13. 205 S.C. 215, 31 S.E.2d 317 (1944)(plaintiff's cause of action against trustee in
his individual capacity barred because plaintiff lost in an earlier suit on same issue
brought by trustee on trust's behalf).
14. 89 S.C. 408, 71 S.E. 1010 (1910)(party brought suit against lessor based on alleged negligence of lessee; when he lost he was precluded from bringing suit against
lessee).
15. At least one other court agrees that South Carolina had previously abolished the
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ing, however, because Mackey, Watson, and Jenkins created exceptions to the privity requirement without changing the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. 16 In fact, In re Asbestosis Cases,17
which was decided long after Mackey, reaffirmed the South Carolina Supreme Court's traditional support of the privity
requirement."'
Whether the court previously abandoned the privity requirement or merely made exceptions in its application is a
question rendered irrelevant by Graham. Now a party to a suit
in South Carolina may assert the defense of collateral estoppel
despite a lack of mutuality if the party against whom the defense is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
relevant issue in a previous action.19
privity requirement. The California Supreme Court cited Jenkins as authority for its
statement in Bernhard that the modern trend is to disregard the privity requirement
when defensive collateral estoppel is at issue. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 812, 122 P.2d at
895.
16. Both Mackey and Jenkins dealt with derivative liability. In Mackey, the defendant counterclaimed against an employer for an employee's alleged tort. When the defendant lost on the counterclaim, he attempted to sue the employee, but was precluded
from doing so because of the complete identity which exists between an employer and
his employee. 234 S.C. at 34, 106 S.E.2d at 897. In Jenkins, the plaintiff brought an
action against a lessor claiming negligence on the part of the lessee. The lessor was found
not liable because the lessee was not negligent. The supreme court held that the plaintiff
could not later sue the lessee because the issue had already been litigated and resolved in
the lessee's favor. 89 S.C. at 413, 71 S.E. at 1012.
The results in Mackey and Jenkins might have been the same had the court simply
relaxed its definition of privity. See generally, First Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 207 S.C. 15, 35 S.E.2d 47 (1945)(privity involves a person so
identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right); Dillingham v.
Gardner, 222 N.C. 79, 21 S.E.2d 898 (1942)(privies are persons connected together or
having mutual interest in action by some relation other than that of contract). However,
the court chose not to lower the requirements for a showing of privity. Instead, as in
Watson, the court did not rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Its decisions were
based on the doctrine of "equitable estoppel" which rests "upon the wholesome principle
which allows every litigant one opportunity to try his case on the merits, but limits him,
in the interest of the public, to one such opportunity." Jenkins, 89 S.C. at 412, 71 S.E.
1012.
17. 274 S.C. 421, 266 S.E.2d 773 (1980). In re Asbestosis Cases dealt with the attempted use of res judicata. But res judicata, like collateral estoppel, traditionally has
only been "available against persons who either were parties to the prior judgment on
the merits or in privity with such parties." Id. at 432, 266 S.E.2d at 778.
18. See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Hall, 101 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.S.C. 1951); Gleaton v. Southern Ry. Co., 212 S.C. 186, 46 S.E.2d 879 (1948); In re Lemack's Estate, 207 S.C. 137, 35
S.E.2d 34 (1945).
19. 277 S.C. at 390-91, 287 S.E.2d at 496. This is a constitutional due process requirement. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979).
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While the holding in Graham is limited to defensive collat-.
eral estoppel, the court did not expressly preclude the offensive
use of nonmutual collateral estoppel.Y° A few jurisdictions have
already permitted offensive collateral estoppel in certain situations. In Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore,21 the United
States Supreme Court granted federal trial courts broad discretion to determine when offensive collateral estoppel should be
applied. 22 The Court concluded, however, that collateral estoppel should not be allowed whenever a plaintiff "could easily have
joined in the earlier action or where . .. [its] application . . .

would be unfair to a defendant."2 s Recently, Iowa24 and Maine 5
followed Parklane and granted trial courts discretion to allow
the use of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel when no,un28
fairness to the defendant would result.

It took many years for the South Carolina Supreme Court
to abolish the mutuality requirement in defensive collateral estoppel. The facts in Graham made that case a propitious vehicle
for altering the privity component of the doctrine. The Graham
decision may be an indication of the court's willingness to reconsider ancient doctrines, so that if it were presented with cogent

20. In deciding whether collateral estoppel should be allowed "notwithstanding a
lack of privity, the courts have taken into consideration whether the doctrine is used
offensively or defensively. . . ." 277 S.C. at 390-91, 287 S.E.2d at 496.
21. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
22. The court previously abandoned the mutuality requirement for assertion of defensive collateral estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971)(patentee sought to relitigate the validity of a patent after a
federal court in a previous lawsuit declared it invalid).
23. 439 U.S. at 331.
24. Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1981) (absence of mutuality not necessarily a bar to offensive application of collateral estoppei, but not allowed in
this case because plaintiff could have joined in previous suit).
25. Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762 (Me. 1979)(offensive collateral estoppel in the
absence of privity allowed despite running of statute of limitations).
26. The Supreme Court of Maine allows a plaintiff to assert offensive collateral estoppel despite a lack of privity unless the defendant shows that the plaintiff should have
joined in the first action, that allowing collateral estoppel would prejudice the defendant,
or that he lacked a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior suit. Hossler, 403 A.2d at 769. The Iowa Supreme Court also will not allow the use of offensive
collateral estoppel when mutuality is lacking if the plaintiff could have joined in the first
suit or the defendant did not have a fair and full chance to litigate the issue. Hunter, 300
N.W.2d at 125-26. The difference between the courts is that Iowa, unlike Maine, apparently places the burden of proof on the party seeking to assert collateral estoppeL In
addition, Iowa's determination of the question of fairness is more extensive and considers all of the factors mentioned in Parklane. Id. at 124-25.
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arguments, the court might well consider eliminating the privity
requirement for offensive collateral estoppel as well.
Daniel F. Norfleet

II.

LONG ARM STATUTE JURISDICTION MAY NOT BE AVOIDED BY
A DEFENDANT'S KNOWING REFUSAL OF NOTICE

In Patel v. Southern Brokers, Ltd.,2 7 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a non-resident defendant subject to
South Carolina's long arm statute cannot avoid the jurisdiction
of South Carolina courts by refusing to accept a certified letter
known to contain a summons and complaint. 8 This decision
places South Carolina in agreement with most other states that
have considered the issue.2 9
In June 1978, Southern Brokers, Ltd., a North Carolina corporation transacting business in South Carolina, sold a motel located in Allendale, South Carolina to the plaintiffs, Pashabhai
P. Patel and Shanta P. Patel.3 0 The Patels subsequently brought
an action for fraudulent representation against Southern Brokers.3 1 Service of process was attempted pursuant to sections 362-803 and -806 of the South Carolina Code, commonly known as
the long arm statute.2 The Patels' attorney forwarded a copy of

27. 277 S.C. 490, 289 S.E.2d 642 (1982).
28. Id. at 493, 289 S.E.2d at 644.
29. See Boss v. Irvine, 228 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Wash. 1939); Fernandez v. Chamberlain, 201 So.2d 781, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23
S.E.2d 595 (1942); Schaff v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947); State v. District
Court of Second Judicial Dist., 107 Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750 (1939). But see Dwyer v.
Shack, 232 A.D. 780, 248 N.Y.S. 355 (1931).
30. 277 S.C. at 491, 289 S.E.2d at 643.
31. Record at 5-6, 18-22. The Special Referee found that, in the course of negotiations over the sale of the motel, the defendant, Southern Brokers, made reckless and
knowing false, incomplete, and untrue representations about past and projected occupancy rates of the motel, gross receipts, gross operating profit, cash flow, and previous
selling price, as inducements to buy the motel.
32. Brief for Respondent at 3. Relevant portions of S.C. CoDE ANN. § 36-2-803
(1976) are as follows:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this State;
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this State;
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by
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the summons and complaint to Southern Brokers' corporate office in North Carolina by certified mail, return receipt requested.
Realizing the contents of the envelope, Southern Brokers refused to accept delivery, 33 and a default judgment resulted.
Southern Brokers sought to vacate the default judgment, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction because the summons and
complaint were never received.3 5 The trial court denied the motion and the supreme court affirmed.
The supreme court reasoned that Southern Brokers received
the opportunity to participate in and defend the action. 6 The
Patels complied with the long arm statute by making the summons and complaint available to Southern Brokers. Thus,
Southern Brokers was not denied due process but merely re-

either party in this State;....
Relevant portions of S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-806 (1976) are the following.
(1) When the law of this State authorizes service outside this State, the
service, when reasonably calculated to give actual notice, may be made:
(c) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and
requiring a signed receipt; or
(2) . .. When service is made pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection (1) . . . proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the
court.
33. Record at 27. The Special Referee found that Southern Brokers had knowledge
of the lawsuit through communications with the co-defendant, Richard L. Haddox. The
Special Referee found that Southern Brokers "knew the name of plaintiff's attorney,
knew that the envelope contained or probably contained legal process concerning the
lawsuit, and that it wilfully and deliberately refused to accept the summons and complaint in an attempt to avoid the process of this Court." Id. This finding was not challenged by Southern Brokers.
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 36.
36. 277 S.C. at 494, 289 S.E.2d at 645. The court's determination that jurisdiction
was acquired by effective service of process on Southern Brokers rendered it unnecessary
for it to consider whether the record showed that jurisdiction had been acquired. Without the statutorily required return receipt, the record obviously did not show that jurisdiction had been acquired. However, the court did conclude that the service of process
and not the proof of service gives jurisdiction to a court. The court stated the following.
Accordingly, the court might, even now, allow proof of service to be
amended and supplied so as to reflect that which truly happened. Inasmuch as
the agreed statement of facts admits that the Defendant refused the Summons
and Complaint, an amendment, though permissible and proper, is not necessary. If the Defendant suffers material prejudice, it is not because of the inadequacy of proof. The injury suffered is the result of a self-inflicted wound.
Id. at 492, 289 S.E.2d at 643-44.
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fused to be a party to the litigation.3 7 The court ruled that "it
can hardly be logically argued that one may avoid the process of
the court by merely refusing to accept a letter known to contain
a summons and complaint." 8
The purpose of the service of the summons and complaint is
to give proper notice to the defendant of the pendency of the
lawsuit. 39 The court did not accept Southern Brokers' contention
that the statutory requirements for service of process must always be strictly followed to have effective service. While overlooking the general law supporting this proposition, ° the court's
break with tradition in Patel is neither unjustified nor unprecedented. In a factually similar case, the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld service, stating:
It is clear from the record that plaintiff's failure to fully comply with the requirements of.the statute was caused by defendant's refusal to receive the letters and sign the receipt. Such
refusal made it impossible for the plaintiff to file a return receipt with his declaration. It would create an intolerable situation if the defendant could, by his own willful act or refusal to
act, prevent the plaintiff from maintaining his action. It is a
situation the Court cannot recognize."

The South Carolina Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether a non-resident defendant would be subject to

long arm statute jurisdiction despite his refusal to accept deliv37. Id. at 494, 289 S.E.2d at 645.
38. Id. at 493, 289 S.E.2d at 644.
39. See Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Still, 140 S.C. 18, 138 S.E. 401 (1927); 62 AM. JUR.
2d Process § 67 (1972).
40. See 62 AM. JuR. 2d Process§ 42 (1972). "Provisions thus prescribing the manner
of service and the prescribed procedure must be strictly pursued. Unless the specified
requirements are complied with, there is no valid service." Id.
41. Creadick v. Keller, 160 A. 909 (Del. 1932). See also Merriott v. Whitsell, 476
S.W.2d 230, 231 (Ark. 1972)(defendant "cannot defeat the jurisdiction by the simple expedient of refusing to accept a registered letter); Cherry v. Hoffernan, 182 So. 427, 429
(1938)("If defendant chooses to flout the notice and refuse to accept it, he will not be
permitted to say in the next breath that he has not been served"); Thomas Organ Co. v.
Universal Music Co., 261 So.2d 323, 327 (La. Ct. App. 1972) ("To allow a defendant to
defeat service of process by refusing to accept a registered letter or to allow a member of
his family to receive it for him ineffectually would make a mockery [of the longarm statute] and render it completely ineffective."). For a discussion of the validity of service by
mail which fails to reach the defendant, see generally Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The
Validity of Service of Process by Mail when there is No Return Receipt: The Outer
Limits of the Due Process, 25 OKLA. L. REv. 566 (1975).
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ery of a certified letter known to contain a summons and complaint absent proof of such knowledge. Lacking such proof, the
court cannot assume that the notification purpose of the summons and complaint has been achieved. Actual notification is
not required, however, since due process only requires that the
method of service be reasonably calculated to give the defendant
actual notice of the lawsuit.42 Apparently adopting this position,
the court stated that the plaintiff complied with the long arm
statute and that the defendant refused to recognize South Carolina law.4 3 Additionally, the court cited with approval several
cases upholding attempted service by mail which did not adduce
that the defendants knew the contents of the mail they refused
to accept. 4 It seems unlikely, therefore, that a defendant's claim
of ignorance would alter the result reached in Patel.
David L. Morrison
III. POST CONVICTION RELIEF: AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE
AGAINST SUCCESSIVE APPLICATIONS

In Case v. State,45 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that the defendant's application for post conviction relief warranted a hearing despite its successiveness. 46 This case repre-

sents a departure from the court's earlier tendency to strictly
interpret post-conviction procedure regulations 47 and carves out

42. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); 62 AM. Jun. 2d Process § 67
(1972).
43. 277 S.C. at 494-95, 289 S.E.2d at 645. The court continued, "the mailman was
not required to ram [the summons and complaint] down the defendant's throat." Id. at
495, 289 S.E.2d at 645.
44. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
45. 277 S.C. 474, 289 S.E.2d 413 (1982).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (1976) provides:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground finally
adjudicated or not so raised or knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived
in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other
proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for
subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the
original, supplemental or amended application.
Applications which violate the requirements of this statute are said to be
"successive."
47. See generally Land v. State, 274 S.C. 243, 262 S.E.2d 735 (1980); Hunter v.
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an exception
to Rule 3 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Proce8
4
dure Act.

Appellant David Earl Case entered a guilty plea to a charge
of housebreaking and received a sentence of three years. The execution of the sentence was delayed, and four days later Case
was again arrested for housebreaking. He pled guilty and was
sentenced to an additional five year term.49
Without benefit of counsel, Case appealed the conviction to
the South Carolina Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed. He then filed an application for post-conviction relief in
which he alleged bribery and incompetence of counsel"0 prior to
entering his guilty plea. 51 The court dismissed this application
because it lacked "specificity." 52
Case did not appeal the dismissal of his first application,
but filed a second application for post-conviction relief, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary guilty plea.
The State made return to the application, and the court appointed an attorney to represent Case. In a subsequent hearing,
the second application was deemed successive53 and was dismissed. 54 Case appealed the dismissal of his second application,

State, 271 S.C. 48, 244 S.E.2d 530 (1978).
48. Rule 3 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act was adopted by the supreme court pursuant to the 1962 Code § 17-611 (now § 17-27-110) and became effective

October 1, 1969. The text of Rule 3 is as follows:
Under Section 8 of the Act [§ 17-27-90 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976], successive applications for relief are not to be entertained, and the
burden shall be on the applicant to establish that any new ground raised in a
subsequent application could not have been raised by him in the previous
application.
49. Record at 2-4.
50. S.C. CODE ANN.§ 17-27-20 (1976) allows a convicted person to apply for postconviction relief if the claimant asserts that the conviction was in violation of the United
States Constitution. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution, as incorporated by the fourteenth amendment, requires that a person accused of a criminal offense

be provided legal counsel South Carolina has recognized that due process of law requires
effective assistance of legal counsel. State v. Cowart, 251 S.C. 360, 162 S.E.2d 535 (1968).
51. Record at ii.
52. Mere allegations of incompetency or ineffectiveness of counsel will not ordinarily
suffice as grounds for a new trial, under § 17-27-20 of the S.C. Code. The convicted

person must allege specific instances of incompetence or ineffectiveness of counsel, and
the "lack of effective counsel must be of such a kind as to shock the conscience of the
court and make the proceedings a farce and mockery of justice." Coardes v. State, 262
S.C. 493, 494, 206 S.E.2d 264, 265 (1974).
53. See supra note 46.

54. Record at ii-iii.
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and the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and remanded
for a hearing on the merits.55
In explaining why it decided to allow Case a hearing, the
court tersely stated that the decison was based on "the unique
combination of facts in this case 5 6 and cited Rogers v. State,7
Delaney v. State,5" and Rule 5 of the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act. 9 The court's reliance on Rogers and Delaney is
understandable; however, Rule 5 provides support for the court's
decision only if Rule 3 is interpreted liberally.
Case claimed that he was entitled to post-conviction relief
because his conviction violated his rights under the United
States Constitution. In Rogers, the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that ineffective assistance of counsel is a due process
violation which provides grounds for post-conviction relief. In
Delaney, the court held that the appellant was entitled to a
post-conviction evidentiary hearing because his allegations could
not have been refuted on the basis of the record before the lower
court. 1 Similarly, Case's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because he was unaware of his right to appeal6 2 could not be refuted by the trial record. Case's additional
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel either could not
be refuted on the basis of the existing record63 or tended to be

55. 277 S.C. at 474, 289 S.E.2d at 413.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 475, 289 S.E.2d at 413.
261 S.C. 288, 199 S.E.2d 761 (1973).
269 S.C. 555, 238 S.E.2d 679 (1977).
Rule 5 of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act provides as follows:
After return is made by the State, if the application presents questions of
law or issues of fact requiring a hearing, the court shall appoint counsel
promptly to assist the applicant if he is an indigent person. Counsel shall be
given a reasonable time to confer with the applicant and to amend the application as filed if desired. Counsel shall have the duty to ascertain from the applicant whether he has included all grounds known to the applicant as a basis for
attacking the judgment and sentence and to amend the application to include
any claims not already included.

S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -120 (1976).

60. See supra note 50.
61. But see Coardes v. State, 262 S.C. 493, 206 S.E.2d 264 (1974), in which the court
refused a post-conviction evidentiary hearing for an applicant whose factual basis for
relief was overwhelmingly refuted by the trial record.
62. Delaney claimed he did not know he had a right to appeal his conviction,
whereas Case alleged he was unaware of his right to appeal the dismissal of his first postconviction application. Record at 28.
63. Record at 15-16.
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supported by the record. 4
The record clearly shows that Case's first application was
too vague to present "questions of law or issues of fact requiring
a hearing.1e5 Under a strict reading of Rule 5 of the Post-Con-

viction Procedure Rules,6" the State is not required to appoint
counsel for an indigent applicant. Furthermore, under a narrow
reading of Rule 3,67 Case's second application would not have

been allowed. Perhaps in recognition of Case's deficiencies as a
lawyer or perhaps because of the "unique combination of facts
in this case," the court made an exception to the rule against
successive applications.," After Case submitted an application
which presented questions of fact requiring a hearing, Rule 5
was triggered, and he received assistance of counsel as if he had
never filed a previous application.
The impact of the court's holding in Case is not clear. Certainly, there will be an increased number of instances in which a
convict may be allowed to file more than one application for
post-conviction relief, but an elevation of the procedural due
processe9 afforded to some post-conviction applicants will not result in the collapse of the orderly administration of post-conviction appeals envisioned by the South Carolina Attorney Gen-

64. For example, Case claimed that the efforts of his counsel were lacking in competency and in diligence because his lawyer had only conferred with him once before the
trial and had refused to investigate the circumstances of the arrest to determine whether
Case had a viable defense. Record at 15. Some evidence of Case's allegation is supplied
by the transcript of the guilty plea. When the judge asked the defense attorney to tell
him about the defendant's side of the issue he replied, "Your Honor, I realize that you
probably know more about Mr. Case than I do at this point." Record at 3.
65. Record at ii.
66. See supra note 59.
67. See supra note 48.
68. Even the State recognizes that the rule against successive applications is not
without exception, as clearly specified in § 17-27-90. The State argued, however, that a
claimant should not be able to avoid including all of his grounds for relief in his application simply because he is ignorant of the law. Most petitioners for post-conviction relief
are laymen untrained in the law, the State argued that if ignorance of the law allows
filing of successive applications, then the State must provide counsel for every indigent
applying for post-conviction relief or permit innumerable applications from one applicant. Brief of Respondent at 10.
69. Effective October 1, 1982, the Supreme Court of South Carolina will no longer
hear all applications for post-conviction relief. The petitioner must file a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari. This reduces an applicant's chances of getting an evidentiary hearing
and increases the importance of having assistance of counsel in drafting the relief application. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -120 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
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eral. 70 Applicants who are allowed to submit successive
applications for post-conviction relief will continue to be a narrowly defined group. Case only indicates that when an indigent
person has been convicted of a crime and submits a second application for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel and the allegations cannot be refuted on the basis of
the record before the court,7 ' the court may allow the applicant
a hearing on the merits of the claim despite the "successiveness"
of the application.
Daniel F. Norfleet
IV.

CITATION FOR CONTEMPT WHILE COMPLYING WITH THE

ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE'S COURT.

In Curlee v. Howle, 2 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a trial judge may properly impose a conditional one
year jail sentence upon an individual found to be in civil contempt, even though the sentence was imposed without a jury
trial. The lower court properly held the appellant (Howle) in
contempt for failing to return the parties' children to his ex-wife
(Curlee) pursuant to a 1978 family court order granting visitation rights. Although Howle argued that his refusal was not contemptuous because a Nevada court had granted him temporary
custody of the children, 73 the supreme court applied the common law rule that when a party willfully disobeys a court order,
he may be held in contempt of court.7 4 This decision is consistent with holdings in other jurisdictions which state that allowing the contemnor to choose between a compensatory fine
5
and imprisonment is a proper sanction for civil contempt.
Curlee is unique, however, in that its interpretation of willful
disobedience includes seeking and complying with a conflicting
order from a different court.
70. Brief for Respondent at 10.

71. The result of this case may be that trial judges will make more of an effort to
ascertain whether the indigent defendant was provided with adequate counsel especially
when the defendant has entered a guilty plea.
72. 277 S.C. 377, 287 S.E.2d 915 (1982).
73. Id. at 382, 287 S.E.2d at 917.
74. Id. at 382, 287 S.E.2d at 918 (citing Bigham v. Bigham, 264 S.C. 101, 212 S.E.2d
594 (1975); Edwards v. Edwards, 254 S.C. 466, 176 S.E.2d 123 (1970)).
75. See generally 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 316(g)(2)(1959).
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Curlee and Howle were divorced in South Carolina in 1973,
and the family court awarded Curlee custody of the parties' two
children. A 1978 court order" gave Howle specific visitation
rights which allowed the children to visit him for three weeks
each summer at his home in Reno, Nevada. In 1979, while the
children were in Nevada, Howle successfully petitioned a Nevada court for temporary custody with the belief that, if successful, he would not have to comply with the South Carolina order
requiring him to return the children to their custodial parent."
Curlee petitioned the South Carolina family court for a Rule to
Show Cause why Howle should not be held in contempt for refusing to return the children. The family court held Howle in
contempt and sentenced him to one year in prison, but allowed
him an opportunity to "purge himself of contempt" by paying
Curlee the expenses she incurred in finding her children.7 s
Howle appealed the contempt citation to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
In affirming the lower court's finding of contempt, the supreme court stated that the court's role in overseeing the "due
administration of justice" gave the judiciary inherent power to
punish for contempt.79 The court also stated that before af-

firming a contempt holding, it must be presented with a "clear
and specific" record upon which the contempt holding is based.80
Although the appellant attempted to justify his noncompliance
by arguing that he had petitioned the Nevada court for custody
because he "was fearful of his children's emotional and psychological conditions,"81 the supreme court found that the appellant

76. Although the opinion dates this order in 1973, 277 S.C. at 380, 287 S.E.2d at 916,
the record reflects that the order was actually entered in 1978. Record at 7-8.
77. 277 S.C. at 380-81, 287 S.E.2d at 917.
78. Id. at 381, 287 S.E.2d at 917.
79. Id. at 382, 287 S.E.2d at 917 (citing State ex rel. McLeod v. Hite, 272 S.C. 303,
251 S.E.2d 746 (1979); State v. Goff, 228 S.C. 17, 88 S.E.2d 788 (1955)).
80. 277 S.C. at 382, 287 S.E.2d at 918 (citing Bigham v. Bigham, 264 S.C. 101, 212
S.E.2d 594 (1975); Edwards v. Edwards, 254 S.C. 466, 176 S.E.2d 123 (1970)).
81. 277 S.C. at 381, 287 S.E.2d at 917. The record reveals the following testimony: In
June of 1979, Dr. Rick Weiher, a Nevada child psychologist, evaluated the children and
determined that Glenn, the oldest child, was experiencing a significant traumatic disorder. Dr. Weiher felt that the children should not return to South Carolina, but that they
should remain in Nevada with their father. Record at 53-54. The respondent's husband,
Paul Curlee, testified that findings by a South Carolina psychiatrist contradicted those of
Dr. Weiher. Id. at 89.
The appellant testified that the children showed signs of neglect, such as uncut
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had no right to rely on the conflicting Nevada court order. In a
footnote, the court stated that the appellant's "proper procedure
was to petition in the South Carolina family court for a change
of custody."82 The court also rejected appellant's contention that
its holding in Cannon v. Cannon s militated against the contempt charge. The court distinguished Cannon on the grounds
that there was no court order in that case to be disobeyed, only
a separation agreement between the parties.8 4
Although the opinion does not explicitly state the court's
view, the supreme court apparently thought that proof of disobedience of a court order establishes a prima facie case of contempt which the contemnor must then disprove. Howle may
have had good reasons for wishing to retain custody of his children, but these reasons together with a Nevada court order were
no defense for his actions.85
While not cited by the court, Jackson v. Jackson" is an earlier South Carolina opinion which lends support to the result
reached in Curlee. In Jackson, a South Carolina family court
issued an ex parte order on March 21, 1961, awarding custody of
the parties' child to the mother. On April 25, 1961, the father
was held in contempt of court for failing to comply with an order to deliver custody of the child to the mother's parents. The
court issued the contempt citation even though an Illinois probate court had signed letters of guardianship on April 20, 1961
appointing the father's mother the guardian of the child. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the contempt

fignernails, dirty hair, and slight malnutrition. Id. at 62. The children, particularly
Glenn, demonstrated symptoms suggestive of psychological abuse and mistreatment. Id.
at 64. Howle stated that he was convinced that the children's mother used guilt to control their behavior. He also testified that in November of 1978, the respondent told him
that she was going to attempt to alienate the children from him. Id. at 65.
82. In note 2 the court refers to Family Court Rule 15, effective 1979, as the basis
for Howle's proper procedure at the time the controversy arose. 277 S.C. at 383, 287
S.E.2d at 918. The court indicates that since 1980, Family Court Rule 9 requires someone in appellant's position to return to the South Carolina Family Court which handed
down the original judgment to obtain a change in custody provisions. This rule states in
part: "The court has jurisdiction of the parties and control of all subsequent proceedings
from the time of service of the summons and a copy of the petition .. Fam. Ct. R. 9
(Supp. 1982).
83. 260 S.C. 204, 195 S.E.2d 176 (1973).
84. 277 S.C. at 382-83, 287 S.E.2d at 918.
85. Id. at 383, 287 S.E.2d at 917-18.
86. 241 S.C. 1, 126 S.E.2d 855 (1962).
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holding.8 7 Jackson and Curlee show that whenever the court
finds willful disobedience of a court order in domestic proceedings, even if the disobedience is in compliance with an order issued by a court of another state, it will uphold contempt charges
against the noncomplying party, provided that jurisdiction over
the action remains in a South Carolina court."8
After upholding the lower court's finding of contempt, the
supreme court addressed the validity of the conditional sentence. Although the appellant did not specifically raise the issue
on appeal, the supreme court considered "whether a judge may
impose a conditional sentence of more than six months without
' Holding that a trial judge
allowing the contemnor a jury trial."89
may impose such a sentence, the court noted that although the
Federal Constitution requires a jury trial in prosecutions for serious criminal contempt, 0 the same protection does not extend
to cases of civil contempt.9 1 The court cited Shillitani v. United
States9 2 as support for this assertion.

Under Shillitani, whether contempt is civil or criminal is
determined by focusing on the goal sought by imposition of the
sentence.93 Adopting this test, the Curlee court determined that
"[w]hile any imprisonment has punitive and deterrent effects, it
must be viewed as remedial if the Court conditions the release
upon the willingness to obey the Court's order.

'9 4

Howle's jail

sentence was conditioned upon his refusal to pay the respondent's expenses, and was therefore remedial rather than punitive.95 The court found that the sentence was imposed for civil

87. Id. at 16, 126 S.E.2d at 836.
88. In a footnote, the court noted that under 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, effective in 1981,
child custody determinations should be awarded full faith and credit in every other state.
277 S.C. at 382, 287 S.E.2d at 917 n.1. Under the provisions of this statute, the Nevada
Court would not have been able to grant the appellants petition, and the conflict of
orders would not have existed. This statute will probably eliminate the potential for similar conflicts in the future.
89. 277 S.C. at 383, 287 S.E.2d at 918.
90. Id., 287 S.E.2d at 918 (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968); Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974)).
91. 277 S.C. at 384, 287 S.E.2d at 918.
92. 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
93. Id. at 368-69.
94. 277 S.C. at 384, 287 S.E.2d at 919.
95. Id. at 385-86, 287 S.E.2d at 919. The lower court also ordered the appellant to
reimburse the respondent's parents for expenses they incurred in accompanying respondent to Nevada. The supreme court reversed this portion of the lower court order on two
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contempt; hence, it was proper under Shillitani.
In Curlee, the supreme court held that trial courts may
enter a finding of contempt if a party to a previous proceeding
willfully disobeys a court order entered in that proceeding. Willful disobedience includes petitioning in a more favorable forum
for a contradictory court order and then complying with that order. In addition, the trial judge may sentence a contemnor to a
jail term longer than six months without a jury trial, provided
the contemnor is given a remedial sentence as an alternative. Although Curlee involves a child custody situation, the court implied thati its holding will apply to any contempt case.
Ramona R. Stephens
Karen E. Molony

grounds. First, there was no showing that the expenses were necessary. Second, the court
noted that "compensatory contempt awards should be limited to the complainant's expenses only." Id. at 387, 287 S.E.2d at 920.
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